8. UP FROM IGNORANCE

We originally meant to review those states of mind which fall short of certitude but were delayed by a long examination of ignorance and its cure.  We now resume climbing the ladder of certitude.

According to Rickaby, after sheer ignorance comes doubt.¹  

Negative doubt is what we experience when “a question is proposed” and we have no “valid reasons” which would incline us one way or the other.²  Suppose a man, say, one Mr. Hartfeldt, walked into a room and out again.  Suppose further that someone asked me whether I noticed whether he was alright.  I review my memory.  Beyond the facts of his height, approximate weight and so forth, I cannot say that there was anything which would suggest that he was alright or not; that he was happy or not was not plain to me.  Therefore, I have no valid reasons to incline me one way or the other.³ 

“The first step out of doubt” is suspicion, which is the faintest “inclination to yield in one direction.”⁴  We may suppose that since doubt is a kind of evenly balanced scale, suspicion is the response to the addition of the weight of some reason to one side.  Yet this weight is very slight. 

Suppose I noticed that Mr. Hartfeldt’s eyes seemed a little bright.  That fact is in itself not decisive; he might be ill or I might just be imaginative.  I don’t want to act on my suspicion that he is upset, since error on my part could be awkward; I merely retain the suspicion as an unfounded possibility just in case more evidence comes in.

Perhaps, however, I notice later that when Mr. Hartfeldt returns to the room he is clearly agitated, that he stutters, that he drops hints about something unpleasant.  At this point I form an opinion—something is not right with the man.  Rickaby thinks of opinion as a probability maintained only “under restriction.”⁵  The probability of the opinion may range from “slender” to “very substantial.”⁶ 

In my case, all the facts could be explained by other means—perhaps Mr. Hartfeldt has a stutter, perhaps his agitation is just a feature of his character, perhaps he suffers from glaucoma—but it is easier for me with my experience to suppose that he is just upset. 

It is only when Mr. Hartfeldt candidly admits that he has undergone some terrible tragedy that we can elevate an opinion to the rank of certitude.

It is worth noting that a great deal of the wisdom of governing one’s thoughts and managing one’s affairs lies in being able to distinguish the various grades from ignorance to certainty.  It is altogether too common for people to admit only of ignorance and certainty, speaking emphatically of mere suspicions and dogmatically of probable opinions. 

ENDNOTES

1.  John Rickaby, The First Principles of Knowledge, 4^th ed. (London:  Longmans, Green & Co., 1901), p. 44.

2.  Ibid.

3.  So far Rickaby refers to negative doubt, but he then follows with a short review of positive doubt, which is what happens when our reasons on either side are exactly equal (ibid.).  This distinction may be useful later.

4.  Ibid., p. 45.

5.  Ibid.

6.  Ibid., p. 46.